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A major active labour market policy for unemployed young people – the New Deal
for 18-24 Year Olds or New Deal for Young People (ND18-24/NDYP) – was
introduced throughout the UK in 1998. We examine its effects on unemployment
duration by estimating hazard functions for unemployment outflows before and after
its introduction. We add value to existing ND18-24 evaluations in the following ways.
First, we examine previously unused administrative data for Northern Ireland.
Second, we examine ND18-24 effects at all unemployment durations. Third, we
estimate separately by gender. Fourth, exits to employment, education and training
and other benefits are identified separately. Our results suggest that since ND18-24’s
introduction, young people are 25-50% less likely to experience year-long
unemployment spells, with increased probabilities for all types of exit. ND18-24 is
intended, however, to largely eradicate long term youth unemployment. We ask why
this has not been the case in Northern Ireland.1
1.  Introduction
This paper examines the effects of the New Deal for Young People (ND18-24) in
Northern Ireland (NI)
1 – a major active labour market policy for unemployed young
people aged 18-24 – on outflows from unemployment and duration of unemployment
spells for the target age group. The policy, aimed at eradicating long-term youth
unemployment by helping young people into work, was introduced across the UK in
April 1998.
2
Our data are a 20% random sample of all those aged between 16 and 30 years old
experiencing spells of claimant count unemployment in NI beginning between
January 1995 and July 2001. These data are taken from the NI computerised
unemployment, or Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) register. This study is the first to
examine NI administrative data and provides the first detailed quantitative evaluation
of New Deal in NI.
The paper evaluates the effects of ND18-24 by estimating hazard functions – showing
the probability of exits from unemployment after different durations – before and after
its introduction. This approach allows New Deal effects to be estimated across
disaggregated and unrestricted unemployment durations in contrast to existing studies.
We also add value by presenting separate hazard functions for exits to employment,
education and training and other benefits, and by estimating the effects of New Deal
on exits to employment separately for males and females. After controlling for other
relevant factors, and using 25-29 year olds as a comparison group to control for
general economic and labour market trends, the difference between the pre and post
ND18-24 hazard functions gives a measure of the effects of ND18-24 on
unemployment outflows for the target age group. Corresponding survival functions
show ‘before and after’ chances of experiencing unemployment spells of different
durations.
                                                          
1 ND18-24 is called the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in GB, but the policies are the same.
Therefore the terms ND18-24 and NDYP are interchangeable, although we stick with ND18-24 for NI
and NDYP for GB.
2 Some areas in GB introduced NDYP in January 1998 to act as pilots. There were no such pilot areas
in NI.2
Our motivation is to inform policy makers, in the UK and beyond, of the effect
ND18-24 is having on outflows from youth unemployment, and the resulting
implications for long-term unemployment amongst young people. Large numbers of
young people are directly affected by ND18-24 (e.g. 650,000 had participated in
NDYP in GB by May 2001) and large sums of public money are involved (e.g. £1.5bn
has been allocated in GB for 1997/98-2001/02). There has also been considerable
recent interest in active labour market policies in many other OECD countries (see,
e.g. Van Reenen, 2001, for a discussion).
The following section details ND18-24, presents brief summary statistics for ND18-
24 in NI, and reviews existing evaluations of ND18-24/NDYP. Section 3 sets out our
model in the context of the search theory and empirical duration analysis of
unemployment literatures. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 presents and
discusses our empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2.  The New Deal for 18-24 Year Olds
Following the introduction of ND18-24, a young person unemployed and claiming
unemployment benefits (JSA) for six months must report for an interview with a
personal advisor or benefits can be withdrawn. There follows a period of individually
tailored guidance and support, particularly in job search, called Gateway, which is
intended to last up to four months.
3 If at the end of that time the young person is still
unemployed, a compulsory option must be taken up (or again, benefits can be
withdrawn). These options include full time education or training (FTET), subsidised
employment placements, voluntary or environmental work (ETF). The subsidised
employment option pays a wage, as can voluntary or environmental work (or they can
attract a small supplement in addition to the continuation of benefits). Options usually
last for up to six months with FTET usually lasting for up to one year. Young people
on a New Deal option are counted as having left the unemployment register. The most
common in NI is the voluntary sector option, followed by FTET, subsidised
employment and ETF. Females are more likely than males to choose the FTET option
                                                          
3 In practice, Gateway sometimes lasts considerably longer than four months. 20% of all Gateway
episodes in NI fall into this category, with some episodes apparently lasting a year or more (Source:
McVicar and Podivinsky, 2002).3
and are very unlikely to choose the ETF option. If, after completing a New Deal
option, a young person is still without a job, they enter a follow-through stage (and go
back on the unemployment register), with three months of further guidance and
assistance in job search. At any time, a young person may leave ND18-24 to take up
an unsubsidised job. Figure 1 shows a timeline for a ND18-24 episode.
4
Some young people are eligible to join ND18-24 early, i.e. before they have been
unemployed for six months, if they choose to do so. These include those who would
otherwise be unemployed for six months but for short breaks in claiming JSA
(amounting to not more than 28 days); those with a health condition or disability;
those needing help with basic skills; those whose first language is not English; lone
parents; and returners who have been out of the labour market for two years or more.
Young people who leave unemployment at the Gateway stage but return to claimant
unemployment within 13 weeks automatically re-enter Gateway.
Since its introduction in NI, there have been 35,671 ND18-24 episodes covering
29,396 people, some of whom have gone through ND18-24 more than once.
5 There
have been 4,876 episodes with early entry (before six months of unemployment).
There have been 2,938 episodes in follow-through. By gender, these figures are split
roughly two thirds male and one third female, reflecting relative unemployment rates.
Numbers in ND18-24 have been evenly spread over the last four years, with the
exception of higher numbers in 1998 as the ‘stock’ of existing young long-term
unemployed entered the program.
Around half of all the ND18-24 episodes in NI have ended with the young person
finding work. Of these, three quarters are described as having ‘found sustained
employment’, i.e. employment that lasted for at least three months.
Our use of 25-29 year olds as a comparison group is potentially complicated by a
related policy, New Deal 25+ (ND25+), introduced in June 1998 in NI and GB. Those
                                                          
4 An ‘episode’ ends when an individual has left a ND18-24 activity and not returned to another ND18-
24 activity within 13 weeks.
5 23,906 young people have had one ND18-24 episode, 4,689 have had two and 775 three or more
episodes (Source: McVicar and Podivinsky, 2002).4
aged 25 or over that have been in receipt of JSA benefits for 18 months or more are
required to participate. As for ND18-24 job seekers are assigned a personal advisor
during an initial Gateway period where assistance in job search is offered. Those
remaining unemployed after Gateway enter either subsidised employment, FTET or a
13 week Intensive Activity Period (IAP) providing work experience placements. An
enhanced ND25+ was introduced in April 2001, offering a longer Gateway period and
a longer Preparation for Employment Programme (PEP) to replace IAP (NI Assembly
Oral Question AQO/334/01). Since its introduction, there have been a total of 29,392
ND25+ episodes in NI, 25,198 of which have been males.
6
Prior to the introduction of ND18-24 and ND25+, the most significant policy change
with direct implications for unemployment over the latter half of the 1990s was the
replacement of the existing unemployment benefit system by JSA in October 1996.
This was intended to tighten the relationship between claiming unemployment-related
benefits and actively searching for work through regular interviews and monitoring of
job search progress for all claimants. Benefit sanctions were possible for those not
showing evidence of sufficient job search effort.
Prior to this study, there has been little quantitative analysis of the effects of ND18-24
on young people in NI. Some survey-based analysis of New Dealers’ characteristics is
presented in DEL (2001). McVicar and Podivinsky (2001) provide exploratory (also
survey-based) analysis of joblessness duration before and after ND18-24 as part of a
more general study, and find some evidence of positive ND18-24 effects.
There has been more analysis of NDYP in GB. In particular, studies by the Institute of
Fiscal Studies and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research are
presented in papers by Van Reenen (2001), Blundell et al. (2001) and Riley and
Young (2001a, b).
Van Reenen (2001) uses claimant count data up to the end of 1999 to examine the
effect of NDYP on the employment chances of young men in GB who have spent at
least six months on JSA. He analyses the JUVOS longitudinal database of a random
                                                          
6 Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002).5
5% of all individuals who have ever claimed JSA. He uses both pilot areas where
NDYP was introduced three months earlier than in other areas, and 25-30 year olds
who have been unemployed for at least six months as comparison groups in order to
identify NDYP effects. Because of a large increase in the participation rate of 18 year-
olds in full time education, he analyses only 19-24 year olds.
7
Van Reenen makes two critical assumptions. First, that the 19-24 year old age group
and the 25-29 year old age group react to macroeconomic trends in the same way.
Second, that there are no ‘substitution’ effects where 19-24 year old NDYP
participants take jobs that would otherwise have been taken by 25-30 year olds. He
then compares the difference in the outflow rates between the 19-24 year old and the
relevant comparison group after NDYP began compared to the difference in outflow
rates before NDYP started.  The focus is on the effect by the end of the tenth month
on JSA of outflows from JSA, conditional on individuals having completing six
months of unemployment.
Given these assumptions, Van Reenen estimates that NDYP has increased the chances
of young men getting jobs by around 20%, based upon a comparison between 19-24
year olds and 25-30 year olds after the nation-wide start of NDYP. This increased
chance of getting a job includes subsidised jobs that are part of NDYP itself (the
subsidised employment option). A comparison based upon the difference between
pilot and non-pilot areas suggests an even greater effect (of around 40%) in obtaining
jobs. These raw differences are also corrected for possible composition effects by
including a set of extra controls for marital status, sought occupation, region, number
of previous unemployment spells and the proportion of time spent unemployed in the
previous two years. Allowing for these extra controls produces very similar overall
effects. In addition, his analysis of the pilot areas suggests no evidence of
‘substitution effects’. In an analysis of pilot versus non-pilot areas, the estimated
effects for women are somewhat smaller than for men, but are imprecise because of
the small proportion of women in the sample.
                                                          
7 In NI, the rate of participation in full time education for 18 year olds has been relatively stable over
the last five years.6
Blundell et al. (2001) use the same JUVOS longitudinal data and a similar approach
to that of Van Reenen (2001) but focus on the effect of NDYP on outflows to
employment only during the Gateway stage of NDYP for males and females. As with
Van Reenen (2001), they use as a comparison group either eligible individuals in non-
pilot areas or ineligible individuals (on age grounds) after the nation-wide NDYP
introduction. They take care to ensure that pilot and non-pilot areas are matched as
closely as possible with respect to labour market characteristics.
Based upon the pilot period of the programme, Blundell et al. (2001) find that the
NDYP has increased the employment chances for young men (19-24 year olds) by
around 20%. This effect is relatively robust to the particular choice of comparison
group, the precise method of estimation, and the presence of other control variables.
However they find no significant NDYP effect on employment chances for young
women, partly because differential trends in GB for the 19-24 age group and the 25-
30 age group make identification of such effects problematical.
8 They also find a
‘program introduction effect’ where the first three months of NDYP boosted
employment chances for the ‘stock’ of young people that had been unemployed for
well over six months. However, they do not consider the longer-term effects of
NDYP, due to data constraints. Similarly to Van Reenen (2001), they find no
evidence of significant ‘substitution’ effects.
Riley and Young (2001a) analyse New Deal effects using data on individuals from the
New Deal Evaluation Database, matched by National Insurance numbers to the
Benefits Agency’s database. As with Van Reenen (2001) and Blundell et al. (2001),
NDYP effects are identified by using older age groups and pilot areas as comparison
groups. They estimate differences in outflow rates for 18-24 year olds both before and
after the introduction of NDYP, and compare these with outflow rates for 25-29 year
olds and 30-49 year olds. Unemployment duration is aggregated to three-monthly
groups. They also estimate time series models for different age and duration groups,
including an NDYP dummy variable and various measures of aggregate effects.
                                                          
8 The labour market trends for the two age groups in NI over the last five years are broadly similar.7
With all these specifications they find NDYP to have reduced measured
unemployment for the target group by raising employment, but also through shifts
into an aggregate category they call ‘non-work’. Outflow rates to employment for
those 18-24 year olds unemployed for six months or more are estimated to have
increased by between 5% and 15%. This is confirmed by their evaluation of NDYP
effects by comparing youth employment with estimated ‘counterfactual’
unemployment. They find mixed evidence on the effects of NDYP on outflows to
employment for short-term (less than six months) unemployed 18-24 year olds.
Riley and Young (2001b) explore whether NDYP has had indirect effects on youth
unemployment through equilibrium wage levels, finding no significant evidence of
such effects.
3.  Hazard Functions and Duration Dependence in Unemployment
Search theory suggests that the probability of a ‘match’ between a job seeker and a
job vacancy at a particular point of time is the product of the probability of getting an
offer and the probability of accepting that offer (see, e.g. Mortensen, 1987). These
probabilities in turn will depend on factors such as search intensity, individual and
local labour market characteristics.
If reservation wages fall with unemployment duration then job offers will be accepted
more readily the longer a person remains unemployed. We might therefore observe
positive duration dependence where the probability of a young person leaving
unemployment for a job at any particular time increases with time spent unemployed
(see, e.g. Mortensen, 1977). If, however, the unemployed lose motivation for job
search the longer they have been unemployed, this might reduce the probability of
getting a job offer, implying negative duration dependence (see, e.g. Layard et al.,
1991). Negative duration dependence might also be caused by depreciation of human
capital during an unemployment spell (e.g. Phelps, 1972), or because employers see
unemployment as a negative productivity signal and are reluctant to hire previously
unemployed workers (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). Given this theoretical
ambiguity, the nature of duration dependence is an interesting empirical question.8
Duration dependence is reflected in the slope of the hazard function, with downward
(upward) sloping hazard functions corresponding to negative (positive) duration
dependence. Empirical evidence on the shape of hazard functions for unemployment
outflows has been mixed, both across and within countries. Reviews of this literature
are provided by Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Machin and Manning (1999).
Studies examining duration dependence in unemployment specifically for young
people are not common, but internationally Heckman and Borjas (1980), Lynch
(1989), Korpi (1995), and Russell and O’Connell (2001) between them find evidence
of no duration dependence, negative duration dependence and non-monotonic
duration dependence. McVicar and Podivinsky (2001) find evidence of generally
downward sloping hazard functions for young people in NI.
One factor likely to be contributing to this empirical ambiguity is the near
observational equivalence of duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity.
People may be long-term unemployed because they have poor job prospects rather
than people having poor job prospects because they are long-term unemployed.
Failure to consider unobserved heterogeneity can lead to a false conclusion of
negative duration dependence (Heckman and Borjas, 1980).
There are different ways of approaching this problem of unobserved heterogeneity,
including specifying a ‘random effects’ type error term for each individual, either
parametrically or non-parametrically. Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) argue,
however, that there is no reason to believe the resulting distortion from introducing
such specifications for unobserved heterogeneity is any less severe than any distortion
that would arise from ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity in the first place. An
alternative may be to adopt a flexible specification for the hazard function
(Arulampalam and Stewart, 1995). Boheim and Taylor (2000) argue that given a
sufficiently flexible specification for the hazard function it becomes unnecessary to
model unobserved heterogeneity. Many recent studies adopt a flexible specification
for the hazard function based on a model first introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler
(1978) (e.g. Arulampalam and Stewart, 1995; Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993;
Bratberg and Vaage, 2000; Portugal and Addison, 2000; Boheim and Taylor, 2000;
McVicar and Podivinsky, 2001). This is the route we follow here.9
The hazard rate (probability of exit, denoted hijt) for individual i in time interval t to
exit unemployment to destination j is given by Equation 1, where θ j(t) is a function
relating the hazard rate with the duration of the unemployment spell. The PG
approach assumes there is a specific parameter that is constant over each period
identified, i.e. the function θ j(t) is piecewise constant. Xit is a set of observed
covariates and β j measures the relationship between each covariate and the hazard
rate.
hijt(Xit) = 1 - exp{ -exp[Xit′β j + θ j(t)]} (1)
Because we identify several destinations after leaving unemployment (employment,
education and training or other benefits) we adopt the competing risks Prentice-
Gloeckler (PG) model (see, e.g. Boheim and Taylor, 2000). This model treats exits to
different destinations as independent, i.e. the probability of exit to one destination is
assumed not to depend on the probability of exit to another destination. This allows us
to analyse ND18-24 effects on identified exits independently of exits to unidentified
destinations (e.g. failure to sign on).
9
A key problem in estimating ND18-24 effects is that of constructing a suitable
counterfactual. Our methodology follows that of Van Reenen (2001) and relies on the
same two critical assumptions: (i) that economic trends affect the 18-24 and 25-29 age
groups in the same way and (ii) that there are no substitution effects between age
groups as a result of ND18-24. The first assumption can be defended by an
examination of unemployment rates over time for the two age groups, which have
followed broadly similar paths in NI over the 1990s. Assumption (ii) is more a matter
of faith, although no evidence has yet been presented to suggest such inter-age group
ND18-24 substitution effects do exist to any significant degree. If such effects do
exist, and ND18-24 has led to the younger age group taking jobs that would have been
taken by the older age group, then our estimated ND18-24 effects on the 18-24 age
group may be biased upwards.
10
                                                          
9 Exits to unidentified destinations include in order of importance (largest first) failure to sign on and
destination unknown. We also include the small number of exits because of emigration, claim
withdrawal, court/prison and death in this category.10
One further assumption (assumption (iii)) is implicit in our methodology, namely that
unemployed young people before the introduction of ND18-24 have similar
characteristics as unemployed young people after the introduction of ND18-24. We
compare observed characteristics for unemployed 18-24 year olds pre and post ND18-
24 in the following Section and find very little contrast. Nevertheless, if unemployed
young people following the introduction of ND18-24 are in some unobserved way
less employable than their counterparts before its introduction, we may be under-
estimating the true effects of ND18-24 on the hazard rate.
4. The Data
Our data are computerised register records for all those unemployed and claiming JSA
benefits (claimant count) in NI aged between 16 and 30 on entry to unemployment.
All spells on the register since January 1995 are recorded and the last point of
observation is July 2001.
11 The data therefore span 335 weeks, and are longitudinal in
that we can track individuals who return to the register through time. Estimating the
PG model is highly computer-intensive.
12 The analysis is therefore conducted on a
random 20% sample of this data, containing 86,965 unemployment spells.
To set up the PG model, we need to specify the duration intervals for which interval-
specific parameters giving the shape of the baseline hazard function are to be
estimated. Although we can pinpoint the duration of an unemployment spell to the
nearest day, some degree of aggregation is necessary for two reasons. First,
aggregating the duration intervals significantly cuts down on the computing power
needed to estimate the model. Second, the interval-specific hazard parameters can
only be identified for those duration intervals in which exits occur, and can be
imprecise where only few exits occur (Jenkins, 1997). We group unemployment
durations as follows: fortnightly for the first year, five groups of eight weeks followed
by one group of twelve weeks for the second year, and one residual group for longer
durations. This allows a considerably more disaggregated examination of ND18-24
                                                                                                                                                                     
10 We also assume no equilibrium wage effects of ND18-24, as supported by Riley and Young (2001b).
11 Spells starting before January 1995, where coverage of the data is not universal, are excluded.
12 Several rows of data are required for each spell of unemployment, with the number of rows
proportional to the length of the spell.11
effects at different durations than has been the case with previous GB studies. The
corresponding distribution of spell durations is shown in Figure 2.
We can identify the number of unemployment spells that end in particular types of
exits for our sample by age group, gender, and separately pre and post ND18-24. This
is shown in Table 1. Perhaps the most striking pattern for males is the increase in the
proportion of exits from the unidentified category (e.g. failure to sign on) following
New Deal. This is true of both age groups but is more dramatic for the target age
group of ND18-24. Relative to the older age group, exits to employment, education
and training and other benefits appear little changed following the introduction of
ND18-24 as proportions of identified exits. For females there is no such pattern of
increased unidentified exits following ND18-24. Exits to other benefits appear to have
increased for the target age group relative to the older age group. As for males,
proportions of exits to employment and education and training appear to have
changed little following the introduction of ND18-24 relative to the older age group.
Of course, Table 1 treats all exits as alike (i.e. regardless of duration) so is unlikely to
tell the whole story.
Existing literature – both theoretical and empirical – suggests a set of generally
observable factors that may influence unemployment duration and should therefore
enter Equation (1). Many of these factors are recorded in the JSA register data and are
included in our model as covariates. To this we add a JSA binary dummy variable
which takes the value ‘one’ for all spells or parts of spells from October 1996
onwards (the date of the introduction of JSA) and ‘zero’ otherwise. We also add a
socio-economic indicator – the Multiple Deprivation Index (MDI) score – for the
electoral ward in which sample members live (see NISRA, 2001, for more details).
Sample means and standard deviations are given in Table 2. Note the (observed)
similarity between young people entering the unemployment register post ND18-24
and those on the unemployment register pre ND18-24.
13
                                                          
13 The list of factors observed in the data is not exhaustive. Information on other potentially significant
factors, such as qualifications held, is unavailable, and information on benefits received during
unemployment spells is unfortunately very patchy in the database.12
Those unemployment spells not completed by July 2001 (the last point at which we
observe the data) are treated as right-censored. When estimating pre ND18-24 hazard
functions, we also treat unemployment spells that start before April 1998 but do not
end before April 1998 as right-censored. Such spells account for less than 5% of the
total number of spells.
5. Results and Discussion
Meyer (1990) sets out an extension to the PG model that allows for (parametric)
unobserved heterogeneity.
14 Given the size of the data set and the nature of the
estimation process for such models, however, it is time consuming: it can take
between four and eight days for a single estimation to run on a fast PC. PG models
with unobserved heterogeneity have therefore not been estimated in all cases, but for a
representative subset of the various models (five models in all). In each case where
unobserved heterogeneity is specified, it is found to be a highly insignificant addition
to the standard PG model. This is a common finding when estimating PG models (see,
e.g. Boheim and Taylor, 2000; Carling et al., 1996) and lies behind Boheim and
Taylor’s assertion that it may be unnecessary to specify unobserved heterogeneity
given a sufficiently flexible specification of the baseline hazard function. We report
only those models that do not incorporate unobserved heterogeneity.
First consider exits to employment for males. Figure 3 presents hazard functions pre
and post ND18-24 for the 18-24 age group, and Figure 4 for the 25-29 age group. The
hazard functions are for an ‘average’ unemployed male in the specified age group
(covariates are set at sample means). There is clear negative duration dependence for
both age groups, consistent with survey based evidence for young people in NI
presented in McVicar and Podivinsky (2001).
Figure 3 is immediately striking – the hazard functions pre and post ND18-24 are
almost identical. In other words, for 18-24 year old males, the probability of exit from
unemployment into employment at all durations of unemployment is unchanged
following the introduction of ND18-24.
                                                          
14 Baker and Melino (2000) caution against using the Heckman-Singer non-parametric (mass point)
specification for unobserved heterogeneity when duration dependence is not estimated parametrically.13
Although there is no apparent difference in the hazard functions pre and post ND18-
24 for this group, we must also examine the hazard functions pre and post ND18-24
for the comparison group of 25-29 year old males before we can conclude anything
about the actual effects of ND18-24. For this older age group, there is a contrast
between the pre and post ND18-24 hazard functions, albeit a small one. Post ND18-
24 hazard rates are lower over the first three months or so of unemployment than pre
ND18-24 hazard rates. In other words, an average member of our comparison group is
less likely to get a job during the first three months of unemployment following the
introduction of ND18-24 than previously.
If we accept the assumptions discussed in Section 3 and there is some background
factor having a small downward effect on the hazard rate for 25-29 year olds, then the
fact that this is not shown for 18-24 year olds in Figure 3 is suggestive of a small
positive effect of ND18-24 on the hazard rate for the younger age group. In other
words, ND18-24 may have maintained the hazard rate for 18-24 year olds at its
previous level despite slightly ‘worse’ conditions.
It is straightforward to quantify the ND18-24 effect by using the 25-29 age group
hazard rates to calculate a counterfactual hazard function for the 18-24 age group had
ND18-24 not been introduced. The counterfactual suggests ND18-24 has increased
the hazard rate for 18-24 year old males at 1-2 weeks from 0.44 to 0.49, at 3-4 weeks
from 0.21 to 0.25, at 13-14 weeks from 0.05 to 0.06, and so on. Beyond 13-14 weeks
duration, the hazard rates are little changed by ND18-24. Although these period-by-
period effects of ND18-24 on the hazard rate are small, they have a larger cumulative
effect on the probability of long-term unemployment. Pre ND18-24, the chance of an
18-24 year old male entrant to unemployment not having found a job three months
later is 0.30 compared to a post ND18-24 figure of 0.23. In other words, just from
increased chances of employment, ND18-24 has reduced the chances of young males
being unemployed for a continuous spell of three months or more by a factor of
between 20% and 25%. This ratio persists through to longer durations.
In terms of magnitude these estimates are broadly consistent with those suggested by
previous studies for GB (i.e. Van Reenen, 2001; Blundell et al., 2001; Riley and
Young, 2001a). That most of the ‘action’ occurs during the first three months of14
unemployment, however, is perhaps more surprising. Information from the GB
studies on NDYP effects in the first three months of unemployment is somewhat
patchy. Van Reenen (2001) and Blundell et al. (2001) do not examine effects during
the first six months of unemployment. Riley and Young (2001) do examine effects in
0-3 months and 3-6 months aggregate duration groups, but find a mixture of
insignificant, positive and negative NDYP effects depending on the version of their
model estimated.
15 A potential explanation for this effect at short unemployment
durations is that early entrants to NDYP (e.g. lone parents, those returning directly to
Gateway) and those in follow-through are exiting to employment faster than would
otherwise have been the case. There may also be ‘anticipation’ or ‘avoidance’ effects
where behaviour is changed by the expectation of being called for interview.
A related question is why we find no evidence of any significant ND18-24 effect on
exits to employment for males after six months unemployment, in contrast to the
earlier GB studies. Is there more ‘locking in’ during Gateway in NI than in GB?
16
Alternatively, is the fact that our model is estimating longer-term ND18-24 effects
and not effects on the existing ‘stock’ of long-term unemployed during the
introduction of ND18-24 driving this contrast? In other words, by ignoring
‘programme introduction effects’ and having a longer run of post-ND18-24 data are
we picking up a ‘mature programme effect’ not found in previous studies? These are
intriguing questions for further research.
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for the covariates in the PG models
corresponding to the hazard functions in Figure 3. Significant negative (positive)
coefficients indicate a negative (positive) effect on the hazard rate. Although it is
straightforward to see the direction of the marginal effect of each covariate on the
hazard rate, it is not necessarily straightforward to calculate their magnitudes,
especially for binary dummy variables. We derive an approximation of magnitudes by
calculating the hazard rate for different values of the covariates around their sample
means.
                                                          
15 Given Riley and Young (2001a) use three-month duration groups and observe data quarterly, they
also fail to fully account for exits from unemployment during the first three months of spells.
16 Calmfors et al. (2001) presents evidence that ‘locking in’ can reduce outflows from ALMPs.15
First consider the pre ND18-24 coefficients. Older young people have higher hazard
rates than younger young people. For example, a 23 year-old is around 30% more
likely to get a job within three months after joining the unemployment register than an
18 year-old, other things being equal. Those describing themselves as seeking skilled
manual employment have marginally higher hazard rates than others. Number of
previous unemployment spells has a small effect – having experienced an additional
unemployment spell increases the hazard rate by around 1%. Although we expect
those with more history of unemployment to have lower hazard rates, this covariate
merely counts the number of spells and does not take into account the length of such
spells. Therefore it may be reflecting fluidity rather than previous unemployment
experience: young people with experience of several previous unemployment spells
are likely to be in and out of short unemployment spells with comparative regularity.
Young people living in electoral wards with a high MDI (more deprived) score have
lower hazard rates for exit to employment. The hazard rate for a young unemployed
male from Wallace Park (the least deprived ward) is a factor of 30-40% higher than
the hazard rate for a young unemployed male from Crumlin (the most deprived ward),
other things being equal.
The introduction of JSA in October 1996 coincides with significantly increased
hazard rates for exits to employment for 18-24 year old unemployed males. Because
of the nature of the dummy variable (it can change value during an unemployment
spell) the interpretation of the estimated coefficient is less straightforward than for the
other covariates. It is also likely that calculating hazard rates for the extreme cases
where JSA=1 or JSA=0 (note that there are no non-extreme cases), using the
estimated coefficients presented in Table 3, gives what is likely to be a fairly
inaccurate approximation of the magnitude of the JSA effect. Indeed, calculated in
this way, the hazard rate appears to be around four times higher post JSA than pre
JSA. We interpret this figure with extreme caution. Using survey data, McVicar and
Podivinsky (2001) estimated hazard functions to be around a third higher following
the introduction of JSA, other things being equal. This is likely to be closer to the true
magnitude of the JSA effect on the hazard rate.
The coefficients on the covariates for the post ND18-24 sample are broadly similar to
those for the pre ND18-24 sample. There is a difference in the sign of the coefficient16
for number of previous unemployment spells, however, which in this case is negative,
although the magnitude of the effect is still small. Where other coefficients change in
size between the pre and post ND18-24 samples, these changes tend to be similarly
observed for the 25-29 age group.
Now consider exits to employment for females. Figure 5 presents hazard functions pre
and post ND18-24 for the 18-24 age group, and Figure 6 for the 25-29 age group. As
for males all hazard functions indicate negative duration dependence.
Figure 5 shows a considerable contrast between the pre and post ND18-24 hazard
functions for exits to employment for the female 18-24 age group. Following ND18-
24, hazard rates are higher by a factor of around 25% at all but a few longer
unemployment durations. The corresponding pattern for the comparison group, is one
of very similar hazard functions pre and post ND18-24 – there is just a slight increase
in the hazard rate post ND18-24 for some durations. At first glance then, if we accept
the assumptions set out in Section 3, ND18-24 appears to have had a significant
positive effect on increasing exits to employment for females in the 18-24 age group,
once again particularly at shorter durations.
To quantify this ND18-24 effect we calculate the counterfactual as before. The
chances of an ‘average’ female in the 18-24 age group not getting a job within the
first three months of unemployment are 0.15 post ND18-24 compared to 0.27 under
the counterfactual. Similar figures for six months and twelve months respectively are
0.13 and 0.08 post ND18-24 compared to 0.20 and 0.15 under the counterfactual. This
corresponds to a ND18-24 effect that almost halves the chances of females in the 18-
24 age group experiencing long term unemployment, just through increased exits to
employment.
That females may benefit more from ALMPs than males is not inconsistent with
conventional wisdom (see, e.g. Van Reenen, 2001). It may be that unemployed female
18-24 year olds are more ‘employable’ than unemployed male 18-24 year olds, for
whatever reason, and therefore more likely to benefit from policy intervention.
Observed characteristics in the data lend some support to this argument. For example,
females are more likely to be seeking managerial, professional or related employment,17
live in less deprived areas on average and have less previous experience of
unemployment than their male counterparts. Another explanation may lie in the
increased proportion of male exits from the register post ND18-24 that are
unidentified, i.e. failure to sign on or unknown destination. It is likely that some of
these exits are to employment. We cannot therefore rule out the possibility that a
stronger ND18-24 effect for males lies hidden in this category, although these
unidentified exits begin to increase earlier than the introduction of ND18-24 (around
the introduction of JSA). Survey data will be needed to examine this issue in more
depth.
Again, there is little in the way of existing evidence for comparative purposes. Van
Reenen (2001) does not consider national NDYP effects for females, and comes up
against the problem of small sample sizes in his analysis by gender in pilot areas.
Blundell et al. (2001) also do not obtain satisfactory estimates of female effects, partly
due to differential trends between the target and comparison female groups in GB
over their sample period. Unemployment rates for both age groups in NI have
followed broadly similar downward trends over the period of our study, however, and
our sample size is large. Riley and Young (2001a) do not report estimates separately
by gender.
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for the covariates corresponding to the
hazard functions in Figure 5. The effects of the covariates on the hazard rate pre
ND18-24 are broadly consistent across both genders. Two differences stand out,
however. Females describing themselves as seeking managerial, professional or
related employment have higher hazard rates than those seeking other types of work.
Two contrasting effects are likely to be at work here – unemployed females seeking
higher status employment are likely to wait longer before accepting job offers and
those seeking higher status employment are likely to be better qualified than those
seeking other types of work. The positive sign on the coefficient for this covariate
suggests the latter effect outweighs the former, i.e. that ‘seeking managerial work’ is
primarily acting as a proxy for qualification level for females. The second contrast
between the genders is in the effects of the ‘living with partner’ covariate. For males
this is insignificant, but for females strongly significant and negative. Three months
after entering unemployment, around 31% of females in this group living with a18
partner will not have found work, compared to around 22% of those not living with a
partner.
As for males, the covariates appear to have broadly similar effects on the hazard rate
pre and post ND18-24. There are three cases where coefficients change in size (not
matched by similar changes for the 25-29 age group). First, the negative effects of
MDI appear to be stronger post ND18-24 than pre ND18-24, suggesting ND18-24
may be acting to increase the relative advantage of females living in less deprived
areas. Second, the negative effects on the hazard rate of living with a partner are
stronger post ND18-24, which might suggest ND18-24 has had slightly more impact
on single females. Finally, post ND18-24 there is no significant effect of seeking
managerial, professional or related employment – perhaps the relative advantage of
higher qualifications is diminished, or the relative wait for a high status job has
lengthened.
Because exits to education and training and exits to other benefits are less common
than exits to employment (see Table 2), we estimate hazard functions for both genders
together. Figures 7 and 8 give pre and post ND18-24 hazard functions for exits to
education and training.
Figure 7 shows an interesting contrast between the pre and post ND18-24 hazard
functions – the post ND18-24 hazard function has pivoted giving lower hazard rates
in early months of unemployment and higher hazard rates in later months of
unemployment. Figure 8 shows no such pattern for the comparison group of 25-29
year olds. In fact, Figure 8 shows a lower hazard rate at all durations post ND18-24
than pre ND18-24. At first glance therefore, there appears to be a positive ND18-24
effect on the hazard rate for exits to education and training, at least for those
individuals that have been unemployed for longer durations.
To quantify the apparent ND18-24 effect we again use the 25-29 age group to
calculate the counterfactual. Over the first three months of unemployment the actual
post ND18-24 hazard function for 18-24 year olds is sometimes above and sometimes
below the counterfactual indicating little overall effect of ND18-24. From three
months on, however, the actual post ND18-24 hazard function begins to draw away19
from the counterfactual, being on average between twice and three times higher. The
gap increases further as unemployment duration increases, particularly beyond nine
months duration. Although the estimated effects of ND18-24 on the hazard function
are very strong, it must be remembered that the actual probabilities of exits to
education and training in all but the first few months of unemployment are very small.
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for the covariates corresponding to the
hazard functions in Figure 7. First consider the coefficients for the pre ND18-24
model. Age on entry to unemployment is (unsurprisingly) negatively related to the
hazard rate for exits to education and training. An unemployed 23 year-old is
approximately half as likely to enter education and training as an unemployed 18
year-old at all unemployment durations, for example. Those who describe themselves
as seeking managerial, professional or related employment have higher hazard rates
for exits to education and training. Those seeking skilled manual employment are less
likely to exit unemployment to education and training. Experience of previous
unemployment spells reduces the hazard rate for exits to education and training,
perhaps reflecting a labour market entry effect, where those that have been in the
labour market for some time are the least likely to return to education or training. The
JSA dummy is again positive and significant – hazard rates for exits to education and
training are higher following the introduction of JSA by a factor of around 80%.
The relationship between age, seeking skilled manual employment and living with a
partner and the hazard rate are of similar sign post ND18-24. The age effect has
weakened, however, following the introduction of ND18-24 (this is not shared by the
25-29 comparison group), suggesting ND18-24 has increased exits to education and
training for the older end of the 18-24 age range to a greater extent than the younger
end of the age range (perhaps because of the FTET option on ND18-24). The effect of
seeking managerial, professional or related employment is also noticeably weaker
post ND18-24, which may suggest those with less qualifications have been
encouraged to enter education and training by ND18-24 to a greater extent than those
with good qualifications. Other contrasts in estimated marginal effects are shared by
those for the comparison group.20
Figures 9 and 10 give pre and post ND18-24 hazard functions for exits to other
benefits. Figure 9 shows a post ND18-24 hazard function everywhere higher than that
for pre ND18-24. Figure 10 shows a similar pattern, although not as strong. At first
glance, therefore, it appears ND18-24 has increased exits to other benefits for the 18-
24 age group. To quantify the ND18-24 effect, we again calculate the counterfactual.
Over the first six months of unemployment, there is very little overall ND18-24 effect
on the hazard rate. From six months on, however, the actual post ND18-24 hazard rate
for 18-24 year olds begins to move away from the counterfactual, being on average
higher by a factor of 50-60%. The suggestion here is that on eligibility for ND18-24
after six months of unemployment, an increased number of young people in the 18-24
age group move off JSA benefits onto alternative forms of benefit for which
participation in ND18-24 is not compulsory. The effect is clear, but it must be borne
in mind that the actual probabilities of exit to other benefits are small both pre and
post ND18-24.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to estimate ND18-24 effects
specifically on outflows to education and training and to other benefits. Riley and
Young (2001a), however, do find increased exits to a catchall category of ‘non-
employment’ following the introduction of NDYP. In this respect, our results for NI
are broadly consistent with theirs for GB.
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for the covariates corresponding to the
hazard functions in Figure 9. First consider the coefficients for the pre ND18-24
model. Age on entry to unemployment is negatively related to the hazard rate for exits
to other benefits for 18-24 year olds, other things being equal. An 18-24 year old
living with a partner has a hazard function for exits to other benefits around twice as
high as that of a similar young person not living with a partner. This is likely to be a
reflection of the nature of the benefit system and how cohabiting or married jobless
are treated with regards to unemployment benefits. There is an interesting gender
effect shown by Table 4 – males are less likely than females to exit to other benefits.
The dummy for seeking managerial, professional or related employment has a strong
negative effect on the hazard rate for exits to other benefits. The MDI score of the
ward in which an unemployed young person lives is positively related to the hazard
rate, so young people from more deprived areas are more likely to exit unemployment21
to other benefits. Hazard rates for a resident of Crumlin (most deprived ward) are on
average two and a half times those for a resident of Wallace Park (least deprived
ward), other things being equal.
The JSA dummy again has a large positive coefficient suggesting hazard rates for
exits to other benefits are considerably higher following the introduction of JSA. The
argument that JSA may have led to jobless people previously counted as unemployed
moving on to alternative benefits (and therefore off the unemployment register) is
supported, even for this young age group, by our evidence (see, e.g. Beatty and
Fothergill, 1999).
The estimated coefficients for the post ND18-24 sample are broadly similar to those
for the pre ND18-24 sample. Where there are differences between pre and post ND18-
24 coefficients, they are generally also reflected in the 25-29 age group pre and post
ND18-24 models.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Following the introduction of ND18-24 in NI in April 1998, hazard rates for exits to
identified destinations (employment, education and training and other benefits) have
increased for unemployed 18-24 year olds, in some cases substantially, relative to
those for the best available comparison group, i.e. unemployed 25-29 year olds. This
suggests ND18-24 itself has caused much of the increase.
We find a clear gender contrast in ND18-24 effects on exits to employment. ND18-24
has increased the hazard rate for young males by considerably less than the
corresponding increase for females. Van Reenen (2001) remarks that active labour
market policy is often thought ineffective for males, although his study concludes that
this is not true in the case of NDYP. Neither is it true in our study, although it does
appear to be less effective for males than for females.
Neither have the effects of ND18-24 been uniform across different durations of
unemployment. Previous studies for GB have either not examined NDYP effects at
shorter unemployment durations, or have come up against data constraints in trying to22
do so. We find much of the increase in the hazard rate for exits to employment occurs
over the early months of unemployment, perhaps because of early entrants or
anticipation or avoidance effects before individuals are called for ND18-24
interviews. The increase in the hazard rate for exits to education and training occurs at
longer durations, perhaps related partly to young people taking up the FTET option on
ND18-24, again in some cases as early entrants. The hazard rate for exits to other
benefits has increased, as a result of ND18-24, by a factor of 50% at unemployment
durations beyond six months. This appears to be a direct result of entry or anticipated
entry to ND18-24. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study of ND18-24 to
disaggregate non-employment exits.
As a result of increased exits to employment, education and training and other
benefits, the chance of an average unemployed 18-24 year old male remaining in
unemployment for a continuous three month spell following ND18-24 is lower by a
factor of around 20%. The chances of the same male remaining in unemployment for
a continuous six (twelve) month spell are 20-25% (25-30%) lower following ND18-
24. Before the introduction of ND18-24, around one in nine 18-24 year old males
entering unemployment would not have found a job, an education or training place or
moved on to other benefits twelve months later. After the introduction of ND18-24,
the corresponding figure is under one in twelve.
The chance of an average unemployed 18-24 year old female remaining in
unemployment for a continuous three month spell following ND18-24 is lower by a
factor of around 40%. The chances of the same female remaining in unemployment
for a continuous six (twelve) month spell are 40-45% (45-50%) lower following
ND18-24. Before the introduction of ND18-24, around one in eleven 18-24 year old
females entering unemployment would not have found a job, an education or training
place or moved on to other benefits 12 months later. After the introduction of ND18-
24, the corresponding figure is around one in twenty.
Clearly ND18-24 has had a significant effect to reduce the chances of young people
experiencing long-term unemployment in NI. But why are these effects not stronger?
If ND18-24 was being implemented according to the ‘rules’ there should be almost no
young people in the target age group that experience unemployment durations of a23
year or more. In other words, the introduction of ND18-24 should have reduced the
chances of year-long unemployment spells by close to 100% rather than 25-50%.
Increased unidentified exits, some of which may be to employment, for males
following the introduction of ND18-24 may provide a partial explanation. It is also
possible, however, that some of these exits represent young people that stop signing
on to avoid ND18-24 interviews. Survey data, or joined up administrative data across
government departments will help answer this question. Given that no such increase
in unidentified exits occurs for females, however, this is unlikely to provide the full
explanation. Two other factors may contribute to why these figures are not closer to
100%. Firstly, ND18-24 in NI has not been implemented strictly according to the
guidelines. In particular, Gateway often extends beyond four months. Secondly, a
small but significant number of long-term unemployed young people in the target
group have still not been invited for ND18-24 interview, for whatever reason
(McVicar and Podivinsky, 2002). Policy makers need to address these issues as a
matter of priority if ND18-24 is to have its maximum potential effect in NI.24
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Fig 1: ND18-24 Timeline
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002).
Fig 2: Frequency Distribution of Spell Duration







New Deal Options – up to
12 months:
  Subsidised employment
  Education and training










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig 5: Hazard Functions for Exits to Employment, Females, 18-24, Pre/Post ND18-24
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002).
Fig 6: Hazard Functions for Exits to Employment, Females, 25-29, Pre/Post ND18-24
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Fig 7: Hazard Functions for Exits to Education and Training, Males and
Females, 18-24, Pre/Post ND18-24
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002).
Fig 8: Hazard Functions for Exits to Education and Training, Males and
Females, 25-29, Pre/Post ND18-24
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Fig 9: Hazard Functions for Exits to Other Benefits, Males and Females, 18-24,
Pre/Post ND18-24
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002).
Fig 10: Hazard Functions for Exits to Other Benefits, Males and Females, 25-29,
Pre/Post ND18-24
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Table 1: Number of Unemployment Spells Ending in Exits to Particular












































































































































Source: DETI. Note: Figures in parentheses give proportion of total exits for each group.
















































































































































































No. of obs. 86,965 13,122 12,216 5,701 4,888 9,238 7,636 2,951 2,510
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002).33
Table 3: Estimated Effects of Covariates on Hazard Rate, Pre and Post ND18-24,
































































































Log likelihood -21,252 -17,493 -13,791 -10,930
χ
2 statistic 17,601# 6,784# 11,073# 4,946#
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002). Notes: The χ
2 statistic is a test of the explanatory power of
the model compared to an intercept-only model. Rejection of the intercept-only model is denoted by #.
Covariates that have statistically significant effects on the hazard rate at the 5% level are denoted *. T-
ratios are given in parentheses. JSA is dropped in the post ND18-24 sample since it takes the value one
at all times. We do not report estimates of θ j(t) due to space constraints.34
Table 4: Estimated Effects of Covariates on Hazard Rate, Pre and Post ND18-24,
Males and Females, 18-24, Exits to Education and Training and Other Benefits



































































































Log likelihood -14,201 -10,250 -6,138 -6,667
χ
2 statistic 9,510# 2,735# 2,362# 658#
Source: McVicar and Podivinsky (2002). Notes: The χ
2 statistic is a test of the explanatory power of
the model compared to an intercept-only model (i.e. not including any covariates). Rejection of the
intercept-only model is denoted by #. Covariates that have statistically significant effects on the hazard
rate at the 5% level are denoted *. T-ratios are given in parentheses. JSA is dropped in the post ND18-
24 sample since it takes the value one at all times. We do not report estimates of θ j(t) due to space
constraints.